INTERVIEW WITH

Dr. Philip Crowl

by

Dr. Thomas Soapes

on

November 12, 1976

for

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library

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Philip A. Crowl
Donor

8 June 1982
Date

Robert M. Warner
Archivist of the United States

June 18, 1982
Date

This interview is being conducted with Dr. Philip Crowl in his office at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island on November 12, 1976. The interviewer is Dr. Thomas Soapes of the Eisenhower Library. Present for the interview are Professor Crowl and Dr. Soapes.

DR. SOAPES: Okay, let's begin with your personal background of where and when you were born and your formal education.

MR. CROWL: Yes, okay. I was born in Dayton, Ohio on the 17th of December, 1914. Did my undergraduate work at Swarthmore College, graduated from there in 1936. Took a year at Yale Law School, then decided to go into graduate work in history and from '37 to '39 I attended, as a graduate student, the University of Iowa and received my Master's Degree there, and then finished my graduate work at Johns Hopkins University where I got my doctorate in 1942.

Prior to getting my doctorate, I took a teaching job as an instructor in history at Princeton University in '41 to '42, then was commissioned in the Navy in June of '42 as an ensign. I taught for a year and a few months in the English, History and Government department at the Naval Academy, and then asked for sea duty and was given some instruction, or as the Navy says, indoctrination at Fort Schuyler, New York and then picked up a command of a ship, an LCI gunboat, and I was in command of her for the balance of the war, served mostly in the Pacific.

Immediately after the end of the war, I came back to Princeton and taught history there from '45 to '49. And then, during the course of that time I got involved in military history, largely from being asked to be the coauthor of a book on the United States Marine Corps and its amphibious experience. On the basis of that work I was asked to join the Army History Division--I can't recall whether that was the

exact title of it at the time--it became the Office of the Chief of Military History. And I wrote, or coauthored, two of their volumes in World War II history, Army in the Pacific Campaign. And in 1955, I think it was, late '55 I had started on a third volume for them on the Italian Campaign when I was asked by the librarian, William Dix at Princeton if I would take a year's leave from the Army to do a special project for Secretary Dulles, who was then, of course, Secretary of State.

The nature of this project was, as explained to me, that Mr. Dulles intended to deposit his personal papers with the Princeton University library. He wanted, as a supplement to that collection, a collection of selected, classified State Department documents which would be illustrative of his career as Secretary of State. And would I make the selection and supervise its being microfilmed and transferred to Princeton? So I agreed and the necessary arrangements were made between the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Army, I guess.

I then moved myself over to the State Department and occupied myself mostly for the calendar year 1956--I think I started in December of '55--simply going through masses of telegrams, cablegrams, memos, minutes of meetings, et cetera, making a selection of those that I thought might prove to be most useful to any scholar who wanted to investigate the operations of the Secretary of State in those years. Just parenthetically, I got the impression, though I'm not sure anyone told me this, but I got the impression that the purpose of this exercise really was to assist Mr. Dulles eventually in the writing of his own memoirs. Again this is an impression, and I can't recall the

circumstances of the impression being given me, but I had a fairly clear understanding that his intention was when he retired to move to Princeton and engage in writing his memoirs. He wanted, in addition to his own personal papers, some of the official records on hand. Anyway, I made fairly good progress on this project, probably completing it through about 1955 by the end of '56, which brought to an end my year's leave. At somewhere along in the autumn of '56 I made some inquiries about the possibility of working permanently in the State Department and was able to get a job in the Intelligence Bureau.

So I simply left the Army at that time and moved over into State Department intelligence. This gave me an opportunity, among other things, in my spare time on Saturdays possibly, to continue my work for Mr. Dulles in his archives and that process did continue until after his death in 1959. I was able to keep fairly current in the production of new documents by working on weekends, so that not too long after his death, I can't remember when, I simply closed down that project. I had selected all the documents and had them microfilmed that I thought were going to be selected. The filming was done at the State Department. Those films then were transferred to a secure vault in Princeton University I remember that I, myself, drove up with, I presume, I think, a Secret Service guard. He and I put the films in his trunk and took them up to Princeton and deposited them. That probably was around 1960 or '61 when that actual transfer took place.

Then later than that, I would guess probably it's 1963, I was still in the State Department, and was approached again by Mr. Dix, the

librarian at Princeton, and asked if I would institute and supervise an oral history project on the subject of Secretary Dulles. Once again the question came up of my getting leave from the State Department and at that time I was given leave for six months to get the project started. An office was made available for me in the library at Princeton and I went up and I think the date here is toward the end of January of 1964. It was right at the end of the Princeton undergraduates' first semester, just before the second semester started, so I think it was around the end of January. Now what?

SOAPES: I want to back up just a little bit.

CROWL: Yes, surely.

SOAPES: In your graduate work, your major field of interest?

CROWL: My major field was U.S. colonial history which was about as remote from what I ended up doing as anything could be.

SOAPES: Same field I started out in, too.

CROWL: I wrote my dissertation in the Confederation Period. It was the, oh, it was called "Maryland During and After The Revolution," bringing the story up to the ratification of the Federal Constitution in 1788.

SOAPES: And who was your major professor?

CROWL: Well, I had three, really, since I did this--I started this at Iowa under Professor Winfred Root, who was then chairman of the

history department and was the resident colonial historian. Then when I transferred to Johns Hopkins my major professor was Stull Holt, whose field was diplomatic history but who was the only tenured professor there who was in American history, so he took all the American historians. The history department at Johns Hopkins, at that time, was very small; there were really only five people in it--four tenured professors and one assistant professor, Eric Goldman, or maybe he was an instructor. So Holt took over and helped me out, quite a lot as a matter of fact. Then he left at the end of my first year at Johns Hopkins to go to the University of Washington where he stayed until he recently retired. And at that time Charles Beard was induced to come out of retirement and take over a visiting professorship at Johns Hopkins. So he inherited me and he was the last mentor to get a crack at my dissertation. I think I'm one of the few people alive who actually were students of Charles Beard. He was great.

SOAPES: Were you with him long enough for him to have much of an impact on you?

CROWL: Oh, not a great deal. He helped; both Holt and--I already had, matter of fact, done my Master's essay as a part of this story, and in the end it represented maybe a third of the dissertation, so that was pretty well completed. They gave me advice and they critiqued or criticized my writing.

Johns Hopkins at that time was different from most graduate schools then--that I knew anything about--in that, in the first place the

department was terribly small. Most of the criticism of dissertations was done in the environment of what was called the senior seminar. (This has nothing to do with the subject, but if you're interested I'll continue.) The senior seminar was a gathering of the entire history department plus those graduate students who were currently engaged in writing their dissertations. And we would submit, from time to time, chapters of our dissertations to this group, consisting partly of our peers and partly of our seniors, betters. These chapters would be copied in advance of the seminars, a week or so in advance of the seminar, which gave the people ample time to read them and to check footnotes and to think about them and criticize them. And this was a very rigorous criticism as you can imagine. Very thorough. So that in a sense the direction of the writing of the dissertation at Hopkins was a sort of corporate adventure in which the actual senior professor played the role of just sort of first among equals, really. So it didn't matter a great deal what a man's field was. As a matter of fact much of the really very good criticism came both from peers and from professors in completely different fields.

SOAPES: Then the movement into military history.

CROWL: Purely accidental. [Laughter] What happened there is that the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Marine Corps Headquarters had some excess, unexpended funds coming from profits of World War II PXs, I think. And they were interested in a P.R. job actually. They wanted somebody to write a scholarly book on the unique development of amphibious techniques

by the U.S. Marine Corps in the inter-war period and the application of those techniques in the Pacific during the war. They wanted this to be unofficial history, and they were willing to subsidize it with no strings attached.

Through a variety of interconnections they approached Princeton and the chairman of the history department at Princeton, then Professor Joseph Strayer, asked me and another chap named Jeter [Allen] Isely, who were both instructors at Princeton, or assistant professors, I can't remember which, if we would be interested in doing this for pay. And we were both poor and broke and Princeton at that time paid miserable salaries--still does, I'm told--and we both needed the money so we agreed to do it, although it was outside of either of our fields. Both of us had been in the Navy, both of us had served in the Pacific, so we had that much connection. Neither of us had been Marines.

We did insist, and the history department insisted, however, that this was to be a bona fide scholarly product that was not to be subject to the censorship of the Marine Corps or anybody in it. The commandant of the marine corps agreed to that and indeed that was written into the contract between the Marine Corps and Princeton. It was a model contract of this sort; I think it should serve as a model for any contractual arrangement of this kind between any agency of the government and an academic institution.

Now the Marines were very cooperative, of course. They gave us access to all their, as far as I know, all of their documents. I

don't know and I never suspected that anything was withheld from us.

We modeled ourselves a little bit after this Johns Hopkins seminar that I've just described in that we would send--when I say "we", I mean the other author, Isely, and I--would, as we completed chapters of this, we would send them down to headquarters, Marine Corps, for circulation among those officers who were familiar with those aspects of the story that we were writing on. They would read those and come up to Princeton and have a seminar. And those were pretty lively sessions. We didn't always agree with them, either individually or collectively, but they had their say and we had ours. In the end, the Commandant of the Marine Corps reserved the right to revise only for reasons of cryptographic security--that is to say, if we quoted a telegram or cable gram or message verbatim in the text of our work, which had initially been encrypted. As I understood it, the law required that these encrypted messages could not be quoted verbatim or even close enough to verbatim to constitute a breach of cryptographic security. And the Commandant had the authority to change those, or ask us to change them, and I think there were a couple. As I recall there weren't more than two or three instances of that sort, so it amounted to nothing, really. In other words, it was our book and it was not theirs, it was not official, it was not Corps history, and it was a good exercise and that's what got me into military history.

SOAPES: In writing the volumes in the official DA history, were there peculiar problems that arose from that?

CROWL: Yes, I guess so. I'm trying to think what they were. Not as many as you might think. I was somewhat sensitive to this problem because one of the volumes that I undertook to write was the history of Army operations in the Mariannas, including Saipan. I had already covered that operation in my book in the Marine Corps, because that was one of the chapters that I had done. Now during that operation there was a serious and highly publicized controversy between the Army and Marine Corps. And even as late as the 1950s, when I was working on this, there were still hard feelings between the two services in some quarters. And I guess without ever being told, I was sensitive to the fact that I was working for the "enemy", and that anything that I wrote that was critical of the Army was going to raise hackles.

As I recall the way I handled this problem--as I say it was extremely controversial, it involved the relief of an Army division commander by a Marine Corps corps commander--and as I recall I approached that problem in this way. That is, I simply told the factual story in as much detail as I thought was necessary, and simply made no sort of editorial comments on it. The factual story as it came out to anyone who read it with any degree of sophistication indicated very definitely that the Army division that had operated on Saipan was very deficient. It was just a bad outfit. But I didn't say so in so many words. Now nobody ever told me anything, nobody ever indicated to me that I'd have to write such-and-such a way; there was no censorship imposed. I suppose there was, when I

think back on it, perhaps a degree of self-censorship when one works for an organization one tends to assimilate some of the attitudes of the organization he works for, I suppose.

SOAPES: But it was not something that was an overt attempt.

CROWL: No, no, never. Not even the slightest. Now we were lucky in that outfit; I should say for the Army's historical program it was far and away the best of all the services after World War II. And one reason it was the best, and this brings us to General Eisenhower at least, was that when Eisenhower was Chief of Staff, it was he who set up this program to begin with. And in the directive that he issued establishing the program, he made it very clear that the truth was to be told no matter whether or whom it hurt. We always had that sort of piece of paper to appeal to. When I say "we" I mean mostly the Chief Historian, a civilian, Dr. Kent Roberts Greenfield, who incidently had been chairman of the history department at Johns Hopkins when I had been there and it was he, I'm sure, who brought me there in the first place. Now what arguments he may have had with higher army command, I don't know, if any. I know certainly he protected us or his presence and his reputation as a scholar and historian, plus his tact, plus the protection--the legal protection in a sense that we had from the original Eisenhower directive all served to prevent any overt or obvious censorship or writing by direction.

The stuff that I wrote was reviewed by my chief, who was chief

of the Pacific Section we were almost all civilians, by the way--there were a few army officers involved but it was mostly a civilian shop. Things that I wrote were reviewed by my boss who was Louis Morton who later became the professor of military history at Dartmouth: remained there until his death quite recently. And also editor-in-chief of the big Macmillan multi-volume history of the U.S. military services. And then it was reviewed again by Dr. Greenfield. Portions of it were looked at by military people, including people who had served in the campaign, both Army and others. As we had done in the Marine Corps, for the Marine Corps volume, we circulated chapters for review and many people, many veterans so to speak of the campaign, reviewed it very carefully and made corrections, suggestions, which we were at liberty to take or not to take. Many of them I did take; many of them I did not, as I recall.

The general officers who were in command of that outfit, as best I can recall, were quite sympathetic with the objective which was to write objective history to the extent that it was possible in the short time that had elapsed since the events. I was never aware that I was under any pressure.

One of the most interesting kinds of criticism came from a rather, to me, unexpected source and that was from the staff cartographer. Very interesting man, retired, former colonel in

the White Russian Army who had been driving taxicabs in Paris during part of the interwar period and was discovered there by some army general, I've forgotten whom, to be a skilled cartographer and he hired him and brought him over to Washington. The reason this guy was so good is that a lot of our work was small unit action history and our records were the best we had which were after action reports and journals. One was called the G-3 journal which was simply a radio log, really, of reports that come in from units as to where they are, where they think they are, and what they've been doing and what they have done. We pull all these things together and you had some kind of a coherent picture of what actually happened. These frequently, of course, were inaccurate. There were checks against these inaccuracies of various kinds, but one of the best checks was the cartographer who once he would try to plot these things out on a map would simply say to an author, "It couldn't have happened this way because the river is over here and your text has it here," and so on. That was very good, this guy was superb--he was a genius, really. He was extremely helpful in forcing us into an accuracy that we might not otherwise have had.

SOAPES: Do you recall his name?

CROWL: Yes, Aiglimoff. I think it was A-i-g-l-i-m-o-f-f, and his first name was some Russian, Vladimer or something like that. Afraid he's dead now.

[Interruption]

SOAPES: Could you describe for me briefly what your job was when you went into the Intelligence Division, State Department.

CROWL: I can't really tell you very much because it's still classified. It was in the Bureau of Intelligence that was in something called current intelligence indications, and my job was partially that of an analyst, at one time I handled Western Europe, at another time United Nations affairs. Then I graduated from being an analyst to being an editor of a daily intelligence summary that was circulated among fairly high ranking officers in the State Department and overseas.

SOAPES: Okay. When you were working with the Dulles manuscripts, were you involved at all in determining what part of those materials went to the Library at Abilene and what went to Princeton?

CROWL: No, that was not done by me; that was done by Mr. Dulles. I was aware of some of the things that were going on but I was not consulted on that. My understanding was that really there were

three collections in two of which I was involved but not the third. Well four if you count the oral history collection; of course, he himself wasn't involved in that because that originated after his death. One was the classified documents which I was very much involved in and really did pretty much single-handedly myself; the ones that were put under lock and key in Princeton and still are there.

Secondly, was the collection of his private papers which he also had essentially willed to Princeton. Now I did get involved in this a little bit in this respect-after his death I consulted with Mrs. Dulles two or three times about just the mechanics of transferring these, and the question of what should be done with those few papers that she did not want to leave out of her possession. And the discussion there that I had with her revolved around the question of should these be destroyed, or should they be given to Princeton under special conditions of access. And in the end I think she destroyed them, and how many there were or what they were I just don't know, but I always assumed that they were private, personal family matters that she did not want to get out of her hands.

I recall once going over to the Dulles house in Washington and looking through a whole lot of filing cabinets in the garage.

Now I can't remember what my purpose was there except just to look at them because she wanted to show me what they were. Then they were shipped up to Princeton in boxes and then somewhat later I was called back on one or two occasions to spend some time at the Princeton library and I think there were two periods of time--one was about three weeks. I remember I took annual leave from the State Department. I think a period of about three weeks once and maybe two weeks another time.

Basically my job there was to advise the librarians as to what I thought would be a proper system for arranging and filing these documents in a way that would be most useful to historians who were going to use them. It was complicated by the fact that there was such a wide variety of things. I mean there was everything from formal dance programs, to citations that he had received when he was given honorary degrees by various universities, to books that he had written or owned, to letters that he had written or received, to pencil drafts of speeches that he was making, and so on. So it was a whole conglomerate of things, and it required some rather hard decisions as to how these should be filed, where they should be filed, what should be the sort of ruling cataloging principles according to which they should be filed. And this involved just my going through a lot of this stuff, at least a

representative portion of it, and just making some recommendations that it should be done this way, this way, and this way. Basically what we hit upon was a system that was not unlike one that Princeton had already used for other collections, such as the Wilson collection, which was a sort of combination of filing these things in chronological and topical order. Chronological to the extent that it was possible, and topical where it wasn't. Now, where were we?

SOAPES: Okay,--

CROWL: Oh, oh, I'm sorry. The third--you asked me about the Abilene--. Now that portion of the papers that went to Abilene, I was told by John [W] Hanes [Jr.] who--maybe I ought to mention a little bit about Hanes, his role in this. Once I accepted the job, the initial job of working on the Dulles papers and thereafter, most of my contacts,--to the extent that I was supervised--it was John Hanes who did the supervision. Hanes, when I first went over there, was a special assistant, a kind of aide, to the Secretary of State. He then went on to take a variety of jobs; he was Director of Security Affairs in the State Department. He had assistant secretary rank, I can't recall exactly what his jobs were. Consular affairs at one time, something like that. But he

kept sort of general supervision over all these activities. So I did know from Hanes of this separate body of material which was neither classified nor, strictly speaking, personal, of things that had accumulated mostly I was told in the Secretary's office while he was Secretary of State and had a sort of quasi-official, quasi-personal status. And that's the bunch that went to Abilene, and I don't recall that I ever even saw those or any portion of them until I myself went to Abilene in the summer of '73 to look them over. This was not handled by me at all.

SOAPES: Why don't we turn then to the oral history project. I believe you've already recounted for us that you were contacted and asked to work in that. Can you recall for me the organization of the project? Was it just you by yourself or did you have assistance?

CROWL:: Well, I started from scratch because, you know, there was no real precedent to go by. I went up to Princeton in, as I say, late January or early February of 1964. I can't recall the exact order in which I did things but I did the following: I went up to Columbia and interviewed the people in the Columbia Oral History Project at some length, I was up there at least once and maybe twice. I saw Louis Starr and Mrs. Mason, chiefly

Mrs. Mason, and they were very helpful. But, of course, their project at that time at least was different from the one that we were envisaging because they were engaged mostly in the taping of, I think they call them, oral memoirs. That is getting down on tape the recollections of people of some note about their own careers, whereas we had a project which envisaged taping people talking about a third party. They helped me a lot, and they particularly were useful in giving me some good advice about mechanics. About what kind of a tape recorder to buy and a lot of other things like that. Oh, I also at some stage talked extensively with Forrest Pogue who was, I believe, by this time, was the director of the George Marshall Foundation and was engaged in writing a multi-volume biography of Marshall in the course of which he had done a great deal of taping himself of both Marshall and other people. And he was very helpful. Then from John Hanes I got at least one list of people whom he thought to be likely candidates for interviews. And I expanded on this list. I think somewhere along in here, yes, early we held at conference at Princeton. Now I'm not sure of this--I can't remember--I know we held a couple of conferences in Princeton, but I can't remember exactly whether these were in connection with the oral history project or the earlier project, I'm just not sure. I remember

it now, there was one at least that had to do with the oral history project because I remember we taped it and we used the machine that we'd bought for the project. And the people who attended that, in addition to myself and Mr. Dix, there was Dick [Richard] Challener, who was in the history department at that time at Princeton, a couple of other people from Princeton, there were several people from Washington who came to that, John Hanes, Phyllis Bernau, who later became Mrs. Macomber.

SOAPES: She'd been Dulles's secretary.

CROWL: She had been Dulles's secretary and then married one of Dulles's assistants, later Ambassador Macomber. They're still in the state department, I think. I think he's assistant secretary of something. I can't remember who the other people were.

We got office space and my first job was to buy tape recorders, to get some stationery, and to hire a secretary. The tape recorders, I remember making a visit to New York City to look those over; I think that's where we ordered them. The stationery proved to be a much more important enterprise than one would normally believe because the purpose of this stationery was to use to write prospective interviewees to persuade them to participate in the project. Therefore we had to create the impression of the respectability of our project, and therefore the stationery had

to be tasteful. And I went over to the Princeton University press and spent a better part of a day or maybe a morning at least making a selection of the letterhead and stationery.

I know what this conference was. Yes, we had to have a board of advisers, naturally. Yes, this was a conference with the board of advisers. A lot of people came up. Hugh Cumming, just retired, I think he was retired by that time, he had been a boss of mine as he was Director of Intelligence at one time. Gerard Smith was there; Johnny Hanes was there; there were several other people who were on that initial board--that's who they were. I was reminded of that because the letterhead listed the names of all these famous people on the board.

I got a secretary, I think she lasted for a short while, part-time, then another one, finally we ended up with a woman whose name I cannot recall who became sort of the administrative assistant. She was more than a secretary, she kept the files, she did a lot of the typing, the letter typing as well as the transcript typing when that started to come in. She organized, got me more or less organized, the project organized, and she stayed on there when I left and became basically the sort of the nerve center of the whole operation. Can't remember her name.

Then we had to go over the list of people we were going to interview and make the decision as to who was going to do the interviews. We made an early decision that we would limit the number of interviewers to the smallest possible, feasible number. The philosophy behind that was, of course, that for the interviews to be successful, the more experience that the interviewer himself had in the process of interviewing, the better the interviews would be. An interviewer himself would build up not only experience out of the interviews but would also build up a fund of knowledge and also a frame of reference, and would develop expertise in the interviewing. The fewer interviewers we chose the more that experience and expertise would develop. Whereas if we farmed it out to too many people as the Kennedy project initially had done, we felt that though we might get pretty good people on both sides of the interview, the interviewer himself would lack adequate experience, and I think that was a good decision. In the end I conducted, myself, I think, about a third of the total; another third was conducted by Professor Richard Challener whom I've mentioned who agreed to get himself involved in the project while he was teaching at Princeton; and the other third were parceled out among a number of people. But that decision to do it that way probably came a little bit later in the game.

Okay, we got the office set up, we got the stationery bought, we got the tapes, and we got a list of names of people to write and ask to be interviewed. On the initial letters the President of Princeton University, then Robert Goheen, agreed to sign his name to all our initial letters. So we sent out a batch over his signature. Simply, the purpose of these letters was to describe the project, to identify me and my connection with the project, and to ask if the person to whom the letter was addressed would entertain the notion of being interviewed. And if he said yes then I received a copy of his answer, and I then wrote to him to set up the interview.

At some time along here, in either the introductory letter or my introductory letter, we set the terms of the interview, and they were pretty much as follows: That the interview would be on the subject of John Foster Dulles and it would be focused on the association of the interviewee with Mr. Dulles. That the tape would be transcribed mostly verbatim, with some minor editorial changes; would be returned then to the interviewee at which time he was to feel completely free to make any additional revisions or deletions or additions that he chose before signing-off on the transcript. That once he did sign off on the transcript, it would then be deposited in the Dulles Oral History Collection with the

terms of access attached according to the specific wishes of the interviewee. So this gave him an opportunity to basically revise the transcript, change things he didn't want, add things. It also gave him the opportunity to determine precisely the terms of access. He could open them to the public; he could open them to a selected portion of the public; he could close them for a period of years; his lifetime; the lifetime of Mrs. Dulles; as some of them chose to do; the lifetime of the Dulles' heirs, as the children I think chose to do; or any other conditions.

Now the purpose of all this, of course, was to impress upon the prospective interviewee the confidentiality of the interview--that the contents would not be used against him or against anybody else whom he wanted to protect. The object there, of course, was to encourage them to give the interview, and we hoped that in this way that nobody would have any qualms about speaking their mind. As it turned out people still did have qualms in spite of all these guarantees.

So then this process continued through the spring, and by sometime in the late spring or early summer of 1964 I was ready to start interviewing. I can't recall who it was that was my first interviewee, I just don't remember. It was somebody around Princeton, it may have been Senator Smith, somebody like that.

But I interviewed a number of people in New York and around Princeton that summer. These were really, in a sense, trial balloons.

SOAPES: You had not had any specific training in interviewing?

CROWL: No, no. The only training I'd gotton, really, was what I got from the people at Columbia and Forrest Pogue. Forrest Pogue gave me the best piece of advice that I got from anybody. He said, "Start every interview the same way." He said, "Ask them when they first got to know Mr. Dulles." He said, "That's a harmless enough question under all circumstances, and it will get them in a relaxed mood and a sort of reminiscent mood, which is what you want." He also advised me not to keep notes, not to take notes--scratch things down on paper, which I didn't. The general impression I got from him, and I think it was the correct one--and from the people at Columbia to a degree, though they were somewhat more structured than Pogue was, or than I was--the general feeling that I got and one that I endorse is that these things are best done with a minimum of interjection by the interviewer. Sort of a stream of consciousness kind of thing that one gets the most out of--. It should not be conducted as interrogations or question and answers or not even as newspaper men

conduct their interviews which are pretty much question and answer. And that's the way I tried to do it. Now you couldn't always do it that way. Some people demanded simple, straight forward questions and answered them rather in a simple, straight forward manner, then we would proceed. But that was generally.

Anyway that summer then we'd written to a number of people abroad, particularly in France and Britain, and enough of these people had agreed to be interviewed to justify my taking a trip, spending two weeks in London followed by two weeks in Paris. A couple of the people in London who had promised to see me, did not. One was Selwyn Lloyd who had been, of course, foreign minister under Eden. Eden had said flatly no, he wouldn't do it; Macmillan had said no, he wouldn't do it; but I had received firm commitments from Selwyn Lloyd who was at that time, I think, Tory party whip in the House of Commons. I had received an affirmative from Rab [Richard Austen] Butler who was, I believe, chancellor of the exchequer at that time. The Tories were in office in summer of '64. I had received an affirmative from Sir Roger Makins who had been the British Ambassador to Washington at the time or just before the Suez Crisis broke. I had gotten an affirmative from a chap whose name I don't remember now, but who was the high commissioner for New Zealand in London, and maybe

one or two others. Then on the Continent I had gotten an okay from [Pierre] Mendes-France- - -

SOAPES: Pineau?

CROWL: I think Christian Pineau [French minister of foreign affairs, 1956-57], and a couple of others in France--Ambassador [Charles Eustis] Bohlen, Chip Bohlen, was in Paris at that time, and Sir Percy Spender who was on the World Court in The Hague. I went up there to see him. There may have been a couple of others, I can't remember. Anyway I had enough to justify the trip, and I had expected to pick up more when I was there, including a possibility of DeGaulle, which didn't turn out. But I think actually General DeGaulle would have been, had he been able to--his people seemed quite sympathetic with the idea-- but it just never worked out. Want this story about Lloyd and all that?

SOAPES: Sure.

CROWL: Okay. My first appointment was with Mr. Lloyd, and I took my tape recorder over to the House of Commons and had set up on the table and he came in. And he looked at this machine as though it were a scorpion and said, "My God, I hope that

isn't going." He said, "That isn't turned on, is it?"

And I said, "No, you'll notice it when it is."

And so he said, "Well, don't turn it on."

So I didn't and we sat and he was very quick to point in a very legalistic way, to a slightly modifying clause, a qualification, in his letter of acceptance to President Goheen of the interview, which he was using as an escape hatch. In short he did not want to be interviewed, at least he didn't want to be taped, and was not going to. Well this, of course, was a great disappointment to me and we spent an hour at least discussing why he should be interviewed and of me trying to persuade him to be and his resisting my persuasion and in the end he won. It was, nevertheless, an interesting interview, and I did make notes on it which are deposited somewhere in the Princeton Library. I think in Mr. Dix's files, correspondence files.

But he wouldn't be interviewed and just as I was leaving his office he asked me who else I was planning to see and among others I mentioned Rab Butler and the next morning I got a call from Mr. Butler's office saying that he could not interview me; a male secretary called me and was very abrupt, and I said, "Well, I'm going to be in London for a couple weeks; I can make another engagement."

"No, I'm sorry." And that was that.

I am quite sure that Lloyd's office or Lloyd himself called Butler and told him, "Cool it," or not to interview me. So in the end I only got Makins and whoever the New Zealander was, I can't remember, in London.

It dawned on me afterward what was going on. I was kind of, I think, the innocent victim of circumstance. I had arrived not too long after some Labor members of Parliament had raised quite a fuss with the Conservative Party about their record at the time of the Suez Crisis and had demanded a white paper on Suez. Incidentally this was the summer just before the general election. The Conservatives obviously didn't want to produce a white paper, and they were highly sensitive to the whole issue. The election was coming up; they obviously didn't trust me or probably any other Yankee running around London with a tape recorder; and it became apparent to me afterward what had happened. I was just simply caught in a political situation over which I didn't have any control and probably Lloyd and Rab Butler didn't have much control either. I think the word had gone out just to cool it about Suez and not say anything to anybody. And there was no way that I could have interviewed them without bringing up Suez so that was their solution to that problem. And we never did get

an interview from them.

[Interruption]

CROWL: All right, now that was that summer and I stayed on at Princeton then until the end of the summer, or the full six months, whenever that came out. Before I left I'd hired an administrative assistant, we'd gotten good office space. I had come to an agreement with Professor Challener that he would continue to interview people largely in the area between Philadelphia and Boston and that I would, in my spare time--I was going back to work fulltime in the State Department--on weekends and so on, try to interview a substantial number of people in the Washington area. And then those parts of the country outside of the East Coast we would sort of split between us. That summer, by the way, I had also gone out to California and interviewed a few people. That's the way pretty much we did it and in the end it ended with each of us doing about the same number of interviews; I think each of us did about a hundred. I think, as I recall, we did in the end about three hundred, you'd have to check this.

Now the others, the procedure was the same, the interviews would be held, then the tape would be transcribed, the person who'd held the interview would lightly edit the transcription. By lightly edit I mean--at least as far as I was concerned--about

all that I normally did, if it was a fairly clear interview, if there were obviously missing words or obvious syntactical bloopers or grammatical bloopers, I would clean those up a little bit, before we resubmitted the transcript to the interviewee, at which time he had a go at it and could sign off on it and attach the conditions of access that he wanted and sent it back to Princeton. Then it was retyped and he received a copy and the ribbon copy was deposited in the Dulles Oral History Collection.

I continued from time to time to interview people, mostly in Washington, a few times elsewhere, Richmond, Virginia and places like that. I cannot really remember the exact date when we closed the shop.

One other thing--there were these other interviews, and they were parceled out among a number of people depending on circumstances. Professor Gordon Craig of Stanford University was going to Germany one summer, and I had known him from when we both had taught at Princeton, and he conducted a few interviews in Germany for us. Holstein, and I can't remember who else. We never did get Adenauer. Professor Louis Gerson who was on our board of directors of the University of Connecticut was going to Israel and India and he got a couple. Then I made a deal, when I got back to Washington, with a neighbor of mine as a matter of

fact, fellow named Spencer Davis. Davis worked for either the United Press or the Associated Press and his area of expertise was the Far East. And he hadn't been over there for quite a while and he wanted to get back and talk to people; he covered the State Department chiefly. So we and the AP, I think he was Associated Press, sort of formed a consortium and jointly financed a trip of his to a number of Asian capitols: Tokyo, Seoul I think, Manila, Bangkok, Taipei, Canberra. And he interviewed a number of chiefs of state and foreign ministers there. I think he had about fifteen interviews altogether, and those were incorporated into the collection. Some of those were quite good. He got Chiang Kai-shek, among others. That wasn't his best, but-- because the old man didn't have much to say. And then there were a few other people, I can't even recall who they are, who took an interview or two because of peculiar circumstances.

In the end, as I say, I think we ended up with about three hundred. There were a lot of disappointing rejections, some really quite disappointing. The exact date on which we phased it out I don't recall. We had a terminal date set on it beyond which we had decided we couldn't go. Challener and I both had other things to do, money was running out, et cetera. But in the end we got, I think, a pretty representative collection, though

not as complete as we'd liked to have had. Our basis of selection of people to be interviewed was catholic. We interviewed stenographers; we interviewed one chauffeur as I remember; we interviewed secret service officers as well as heads of state, foreign ministers, ambassadors, State Department personnel, old friends, social acquaintances from his New York days, family, and so on and so forth.

SOAPES: What was the source of funding?

CROWL: Monies were got together by private subscription. Now who actually made the donations I don't know. It was lot of money, it had to be, these are expensive projects. It did not come out of Princeton University general funds. The University provided us with office space and a lot of help, time, especially the librarian's staff. But that was it. The money all came from outside.

SOAPES: Who did the solicitation?

CROWL: I guess that Johnny Hanes and probably Rod O'Connor, people like that. I don't really know.

SOAPES: Did the interviewers have access to State Department materials or the Dulles manuscripts in preparation?

CROWL: They would have had access to the collection of private papers in Princeton and that's all.

SOAPES: No special access?

CROWL: No.

SOAPES: You did do the interview with Eisenhower?

CROWL: Yes, that was a good interview, yes. Want me to tell about that?

SOAPES: Yes.

CROWL: That was fun. That was in the summer of '64, when the General was in Gettysburg, and I was in Princeton. I drove down to Gettysburg. The interview was scheduled for, I think it was nine o'clock in the morning, I don't know what day of the week. Anyway I drove down to Gettysburg the day before so as to be there bright and early and registered in at the hotel there on the square, and as soon as I got in there was a message for me from General Schmidt, was that his name?

SOAPES: Schulz?

CROWL: Schulz! General Schulz, to call him. So he said that

General Eisenhower wanted to move the meeting up to eight o'clock in the morning, and I said, "Fine, I'll be there." And then shortly thereafter I got another call saying he wanted to move it to seven-thirty. And so I showed up with my tape recorder and I was ushered in. I got the recorder set up and just started a little informal chit-chat. General Eisenhower said, "Well, I think we better get going," because this by now was about quarter of eight, he said, "I think we better get going because I have another appointment at eight-thirty." And my heart sank; I just thought, "Oh, God, this is terrible; I'll never get even started in forty-five minutes." I had a quick decision to make. I had planned initially to conduct the interview in a kind of chronological way starting with General Eisenhower's first meeting with Mr. Dulles and coming on down till his death. So, within the confines of forty-five minutes I didn't know whether to proceed according to plan or to touch on some very key high-lights, no matter where they fell chronologically, but I decided to go ahead according to plan and I started at the beginning.

Well, the General got warmed up and he was very good and I must say I was surprised. I had been a constant reader of the Washington Post and had gathered the impression during his last

administration that he was getting senile and that he couldn't speak the English language and tripped over his own sentences and was inarticulate and generally kind of dumb. And he was anything but; he was dynamic, he was alive, his memory was extremely good, he was very articulate, he answered the questions in a forthright manner but not in an over simple manner. I was just very, very impressed by him. He'd get angry in recollections, his face would get red, he'd smile a lot, laugh a lot. He had all the Eisenhower charm that I'd always heard about him and it certainly came out.

Time went on and it got to be after eight-thirty, and I looked at the watch. He'd come to the end of a paragraph, and I said, "Well, General, do you want to stop this now, and possibly I can make an appointment to come back later in the day or some other day?"

And he looked at me in sort of disbelief and he said, "Well, why do you want to stop now? I just got started." (Laughter)

And I said, "Well, General, I thought you had another appointment."

"Oh, that," he said, "to hell with that."

I guess what he had done was allow himself an escape hatch if he didn't like the way things were going. Anyway we went on.

It was I guess eleven o'clock or so before we finished and it was really, I think it was almost the best interview I had. I didn't have the feeling that we left any bases untouched. After I looked at it there were things that I hadn't asked him that I regretted that I hadn't. But interesting thing about that though, when I examined the verbatim transcript, it became apparent to me how Eisenhower had got the reputation for bad syntax because there were a lot of unfinished sentences, there were a lot of thoughts only sort of half expressed, and I had to do some editing. It was light editing but it was editing of supplying a word here and there which was just obviously missing or supply an "and" or "but" or "however" or a semi-colon. Once I had done this very slight sort of structural editing it all was very articulate and clear, and it is today still a very good interview. And it occurred to me as to what happened. Eisenhower was a very impatient speaker. When I was sitting there listening to him I had no problem at all understanding what he was saying, what he was trying to tell me. It was quite clear. And yet when I read what he had said, it was somewhat confusing in spots.

Basically my own estimate is that he was an impatient speaker and once he had established his point with the person who was listening to him and he knew he had established it, he just dropped

it and went on to something else. I think this is what happened to him because he or Hagerty or somebody gave the New York Times the permission to publish the verbatim press conferences, without any editing by the White House or anybody else, this stuff came out in this raw form and a lot of it was pretty clumsy. But I'm sure the people like me who listened to it understood exactly what it was saying and it seemed quite articulate. It was kind of interesting--some people talk as they write, not many but some people; he didn't. He talked as he talked and he talked fast and he was very decisive in his manner of speech and when he got his thought across, the speech was no longer necessary and he went on to something else. It was interesting from that point of view. It was a very good interview. I was terribly impressed by him. And as I say, I had come prepared to be rather patronizing.

SOAPES: In terms of his appearance and his health at that time--did he appear to be strong physically?

CROWL: Very. Very, very vigorous. He, as you know, he had a lot of body English. He squirmed around a lot. He gestured a lot. His face, he had a really impressive face. I never thought that in looking at his pictures that Eisenhower was a particularly handsome man, but his face was so mobile, so expressive, that you

just were just captivated by it. As I say, if his intention was to charm me, he sure in hell succeeded because I took to him right away. He had a quality, a magnetic quality about him. I could then understand why Eisenhower was Eisenhower. I mean why this poor boy from Abilene had done all the things that he had done and gotten to all the places he'd gotten. Well, the military has a simple word, which is a very good word--he had leadership. Others call it charisma but I prefer leadership. He had it, it was patent, you could cut it with a knife. I can quite easily see why people were attracted to him.

We had one other experience with Eisenhower I might mention--we, I say my wife and I--which was kind of funny. Among other things that happened in connection with Mr. Dulles, a number of his friends got together and put up the money for a wing to the Firestone Library at Princeton, which was to be called the John Foster Dulles Library. This was a little, kind of an adjunct, built-on to one corner of the Princeton Library. And in the course of time this got built and was to be dedicated, and my wife and I were invited. I was back in Washington. We were invited up for the dedication, and it was quite an elegant affair. Lots of important people were there, including, naturally, General Eisenhower who later that day gave the main address, which was a very good

address, and really pretty much encapsulates the story of his relationships with Dulles.

Anyway that morning there was sort of a small, private dedication in the new Dulles wing, and Mrs. Dulles was there and other members of the Dulles family, President Eisenhower, we and some other people, and a number of newspaper photographers.

As we came out, this photographer--I heard him--was saying, "Anybody seen Mrs. Crowl? Where's Mrs. Crowl?" And when my wife heard this she said, "Let's get out of here," because she guessed as to what was going on. Her father was a newspaper publisher in Wheeling, West Virginia, and he had known that we were going up for this occasion, so he had tipped off some newspaper, UP or AP associates of his to get a photograph of my wife. And she doesn't like to be photographed. So this guy pursued us with his camera and he finally identified her while she was trying to escape and he said, "I got to get your picture, Mrs. Crowl."

And she said, "No, you're not." She said, "You're not going to take it."

He said, "Well, I've got to, my boss told me".

She said, "Well, I don't care what your boss said; you're not going to take it."

Well, they went back and forth and finally I said, "Oh,

come on, let him take your picture, let's get out of here." So she reluctantly agreed and then he said, "Well, let's go back into the other room where the light's good." So we did that and there were still people from the dedication standing around and the photographer said something to the effect, he said, "Well, I guess I better take a shot of you along with somebody famous." And he looked over and there was Eisenhower and he said, "Well, he's pretty famous; let's go over and take your picture with him."

And by this time my wife was just covered with embarrassment and she kept saying, "No, don't bother him. No, no. If you want to take it, take it and get it over with."

And finally he sort of dragged her and me following and Eisenhower, well, he got the pitch right away, and he said, "Well, Mrs. Crowl, I don't see why you don't want to have your picture taken with me." "I'd feel honored to have mine taken with you." (Laughter) Well, he just absolutely charmed her and smiled at her and ---. So we had her picture taken and it was on the front page of the Pittsburgh papers, or something.

But those were my, really two only meetings with the General, and both times he came off looking very well. And that afternoon when he gave his main address in the Princeton chapel, it was just a magnificent performance. It really was good. That's been printed

up and anyone can read it. But again, although it looks very well in print, the delivery of it was superb. It was appropriate; it was well-informed; it was informative; it was properly sentimental as the occasion demanded without being too much so. Just in very good taste the whole thing was excellent, excellent show.

SOAPES: One last question. What was done with the tapes of these interviews?

CROWL: As far as I know they're still in Princeton. They were filed there; they were not--oh, this is a good question because it's something we never answered. Although the interviewees were given the opportunity to change the transcript, I think more through oversight than plan we--no, we thought about it. Anyway we didn't even suggest to them or call to their attention the fact that if they revised the transcript there would be disparity between the transcript and the tape, and with a very few exceptions nobody ever asked that the tape be changed or erased or destroyed. There were some cases--people who got it and made significant changes in their transcript and asked that the tape be returned to them or destroyed. Most of the tapes are in their original in Princeton as far as I know.

I don't know of any occasion when anybody doing research has asked to hear the tapes, and I don't even know what the library

would do if they did. I don't know what the librarian would do if that request were made; I guess he'd have to say no--unless he got permission from the interviewee. By and large I was told by the people at Columbia that practically no researcher ever wants to listen to the tape, for obvious reasons. The transcript is much easier to use, you can take notes off of it, you can xerox portions of it if that's allowed, it's much more useful for anybody doing work than to listen to a tape and try to take notes from that. And normally the differences between the tape and the transcript aren't that significant anyway.

SOAPES: Well, we thank you for your time this afternoon.