

STATE LTR 12/5/75 LPH

BERMUDA, December 5, 1953.

Meeting held 11:30, lasting until 12:45 (noon) with Sir Winston Churchill, Lord Cherwell, the President and Admiral Strauss. Following notes written by Admiral Strauss in long hand, returned to him for destroying.

An informal meeting was held this morning at eleven thirty in the suite of the President at the Mid Ocean Club. Present besides President Eisenhower were Prime Minister Churchill, Lord Cherwell and Mr. Lewis Strauss (AEC.) The session had been arranged to discuss atomic energy matters of mutual interest.



Sir Winston referred to his concern at the cessation of full scale cooperation between the US and UK which had prevailed during the war. He made a case for its resumption.

The President explained the situation with respect to existing law, stated his personal sympathy, in principle, with the views of the Prime Minister and mentioned that steps were being taken to ameliorate the condition so far as possible by seeking amendment to the McMahon Act at the next session of the Congress. He pointed out that he understood from Mr. Strauss that certain exchanges had recently been arranged for, within the present statute, but that more would probably have to await legislative action.

Sir Winston then referred to fact that UK planes were being designed and built with no proper knowledge of characteristics of our atomic weapons if they might ever be called upon to deliver them, and, as a minimum,

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he hoped that weight, dimensions and ballistics of our weapons could be supplied to them. He also asked that a number of A weapons be made available to the RAF. The President asked what number he had in mind to which Sir Winston replied "about _____." The President said that in event of hostilities such weapons could quite possibly be put at the disposal of the UK but did not otherwise respond to this point. He asked, however, how the RAF could use A weapons without integrating their target system with ours, to which Sir Winston replied that the RAF would take targets which the U.S. was not intending to cover, adding that he had been given a target briefing when he last visited the Pentagon and that ad hoc enemy submarine bases had not been included. The President asked Mr. Strauss to inquire into this. There was then some discussion as to type of weapon for use against submarine pens, etc.

Sir Winston stated that the UK having concluded successful weapons tests were now embarked upon weapon production, that their first weapon had recently been delivered to the RAF, and that they expected to have _____ by 1957 and _____ by 1960. He volunteered their estimate of our present production as _____ per annum and our current stockpile as _____.



Lord Cherwell here stated that they were not intending to do any work on hydrogen bombs -- that they felt able to get one negaton or possibly two from boosted fission weapons and that in their view few targets needed a larger yield.

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At this point the President touched upon his belief that Atomic weapons were now coming to be regarded as a proper part of conventional armament and that he thought this a sound concept. Sir Winston concurred.

There followed a lengthy discussion of the effect of a resumption of hostilities in Korea. Sir Winston referred to his public utterances in this respect but twice during the ensuing discussion mentioned that Mr. Eden was more fully informed and that he did not wish anything he said in this area to be considered as a commitment until Mr. Eden was brought into the talks. He expressed his concern lest the use of atomic weapons in Korea would bring on the third world war and the consequent bombing of London. He said that their defenses were inadequate and that he could not bear to think of "the destruction of all we hold dear, ourselves, our families and our treasures; -- and even if some of us temporarily survive in some deep cellar under mounds of flaming and contaminated rubble there will be nothing to do but take a pill to end it all." The President replied that he did not think that an attack in the west by the Soviets would be the result of our use of atomic weapons in a renewed war in Korea when what he envisaged was "not a bombing of Chungking or Peking but the pursuit of attacking aircraft to their bases and the destruction of enemy supplies and troop concentrations." He said that the American people would no longer tolerate a situation where our men could only advance to a fixed line and



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remain there to be killed without carrying the war to the enemy." He sympathized with the Prime Minister's concern but discounted it as a reality to be produced by such action in Korea as we might have to take if hostilities were reopened by the Communists.

Sir Winston next referred to the specific exchange of information under the modus vivendi mentioning first the agreement between the two countries arranged by Cherwell and Strauss in November (exchange of data on weapons effects). He expressed his gratification at this. He said, however, that he also felt that there should be more freedom of information between the two countries on discussion of intelligence concerning enemy weapons and capabilities. The President expressed himself as sympathetic to this idea. He asked Mr. Strauss what the situation was and was told that while intelligence findings were exchanged the evaluation of such data was not exchanged -- on the theory that evaluation being in terms of our existing weapons, it was considered a violation of the specific prohibition in the statute to do so: The President directed Mr. Strauss to review the validity of this assumption.



Sir Winston then produced a photostat of the original signed copy of the Quebec Agreement of 1943 between himself and F. D. Roosevelt and read from it to the President. (It was the first time Mr. Strauss had ever seen a photostat. No signed counterpart is in the files of the State Department.) Sir Winston stated that in his opinion the time had now come to publish it and related documents. Mr. Strauss informed the President at this point that the Quebec Agreement had been formally superseded

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by the Blair House Agreement of January 8, 1948. It was agreed, after some discussion, that the climate for closer working relations might be facilitated by publication of these and related documents and the President requested Mr. Strauss to prepare a White Paper on the subject. Lord Cherwell will collaborate on this.

Sir Winston briefly mentioned the President's proposed speech. He said that he had some reservations as to the wisdom of delivering it. It was understood that his points would be discussed between Lord Cherwell and Mr. Strauss. He proposed a meeting on tomorrow (Sunday) morning. The President explained that he had filled his morning calendar and a meeting on Monday morning was tentatively set.

The meeting ended at 12:59 P.M.

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