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By MMK NLDD Date 3/13/15

October 8, 1953

MEMORANDUM

TO: Acting Deputy Executive Officer, OCB

FROM: Mr. Anspacher

SUBJECT: Transfer to PSB Business to OCB (Memo from Mr. Morgan dated Oct. 5, 1953)

1. The attached memorandum represents the consensus of the points-of-contact concerned with PSB D-21 and D-21/2, with respect to the future disposition of these documents.

2. In response to questions posed by Mr. Morgan in the reference memorandum, the following comments, also developed in the points-of-contact meeting of Oct. 7th, are pertinent:

- a. the program should be continued;
- b. the basic paper should be revised;
- c. representatives of OCB and the five interested Departments and Agencies should consider the basic papers in the light of approved national policies and plans, and of recent events in Germany, to determine the extent to which the documents require editing and revision; since national policy for Germany has already been adopted in NSC 160/1 (including references to PSB D-21 and D-21/2) it is presumed that such consideration will be limited to operational matters, within the purview of OCB; it should be remembered, however, that in this connection close co-ordination at the OCB level will be required between actions designed for Eastern Germany as part of the Soviet Orbit (in the D-40/45 context) and those designed for Germany as a whole;
- d. implementation should by all means be continued; and
- e. terms of references should remain the same until the adoption of a revised operations plan.

3. My own judgment would be to narrow the scope of a new D-21. Much of the generalizations concerning European integration, and certainly the references to France and other Western European nations, could be included in a Western European paper. I would retain in D-21 only those specific actions which would support the creation among the German people of a favorable psychological climate for political and economic integration, based in our minds at least upon entangling the Germans thoroughly in a

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regional complex from which they could not withdraw and survive. On the other hand, I would also retain in D-21 only those actions referring to Eastern Europe as may be initiated in Western Germany, and which have a direct bearing on Eastern Germany. The remainder of the "drang nach Osten" factor in the existing D-21 could be written into the D-40/45 paper.

4. I would then limit my treatment in D-21 to the most burning issues, i.e.:
  - a. popular support for the western terms for unity;
  - b. political, social, and cultural integration with Western Europe;
  - c. breakdown of traditional antagonisms within Germany and between Germans and their neighbors;
  - d. encouragement of non-totalitarian institutions and practices in every-day German affairs.

As I explained in my earlier memos on this subject, of course, much depends on the leverage available to the U.S. after the Contractuals are signed, and upon East-West "detente" developments, if any. Since the death of Reuter, Berlin may require more specific attention, too, but I would emphasize heavily the importance of helping to create in all of Germany long-standing and mass-based institutions and opinion-climates which will resist totalitarianism of either extreme, and contribute politically, economically, and culturally to the principles and the practice of European and/or Atlantic integration.

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cc: Mr. Kellerman-State/GER  
Col. Holst, JCS/JSPD  
Mr. Bolton, CIA  
Mr. Wiener, USIA  
Mr. Hurowitz, FOA  
Mr. Browne, OCB  
Col. Enyart, OCB  
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