

379th NSC Meeting
Sept. 18, 1958

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MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Policy Towards Iran - Cooperation with Turkey and Pakistan

At the National Security Council today, the Defense Representative asked whether we were using the Turks and Pakistanis in our efforts to persuade the Shah of Iran to adopt reforms and to take other measures to strengthen the internal political security of his country.

To date we have not asked either Turkey or Pakistan to join in these efforts- primarily because this operation is a delicate one in which we must exercise great care to avoid antagonizing the Shah, and to avoid dissipating his present receptivity to our ideas. We should give the public appearance of interfering in his affairs, or of urging him impatiently to undertake drastic changes.

The Shah's receptiveness to our ideas is a new development. We cannot be sure that he would be equally receptive if he knew that Turks and Pakistanis are participating in our efforts. Towards those countries the traditional attitude of Iran has been one of envy, distaste and traditional suspicion, which in particular would not make their help effective with the Iranian monarch.

We have so far discussed with the British the problem of internal instability in Iran, without seeking to work out joint measures for dealing with it. To join our efforts with the British could cause an adverse reaction on the part of the Shah, should he have reason to suspect we were uniting to force him to change his position.

As to Turkish and Pakistani cooperation, we believe this could limit our own freedom of action. The Turks, for example, if we took them fully into our confidence on this matter, would probably insist on the need of building up Iran's armed forces - on Turkey's flank - as a means of strengthening the Shah internally. The Turkish attitude would probably be more inclined towards a military approach to the problem, when in fact, the central problem now is to increase popular support and the support of the growing intellectual classes for the Shah. The Turks are generally not likely to attach much importance to the need for reform and popular support. We are, moreover, not convinced that the Shah would be favorably influenced either by the example of Turkey or Pakistan, or by their persuasion.

Although we would thus not favor taking the Turks and Pakistanis into our confidence in order to work out joint measures for urging reform in Iran, we would favor taking any available opportunities to use them to assist in specific projects where their support would be effective.

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By	MMK NLDDE Date 8/24/12

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