

<b>JOINT MESSAGEFORM</b>			SECURITY CLASSIFICATION <del>SECRET</del> SECRET <i>W 651P</i>		
SPACE BELDW RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER					
<i>Subj: Spain US Depot Maint SETAF "Hahnheim" 6</i>			<i>US Forces Logistics (US)</i>		
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ACTION PRIORITY	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE		
INFO PRIORITY		X			CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE
FROM: US CINCEUR PARIS FRANCE					SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
TO: JCS					COORDINATION: Gen Norstad has seen
INFO: CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GERMANY SECRET ECJCP 9- 07799					
Refs: A. MJCS 127-62, 27 Apr 62. B. ECJCP 9-05762, 6 Apr 62. LN4531					DISTRIBUTION: D/CINC J-3 J-4 USNMR R/E AG SUSPENSE 14 MAY 62
Following comments are submitted in response to ref A.					
1.(S) I agree that a selective reduction in current Army personnel strengths in Europe can be made without serious degradation of our combat potential provided certain assumptions as to readiness to transport units and fillers from CONUS can be met. However, I do not consider that all of the reductions proposed in ref A can be made without a significant impact on our combat readiness. Moreover, certain reductions although acceptable in principle probably					
LN6705					
W R I T E R	SYMBOL EC JCP		SIGNATURE <i>H. F. Dickson</i>		
	TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature, if required) Colonel M. B. ALLEN, USA		TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE H. F. DICKSON Lt Colonel, US A		
	PHONE 8221/bcw	PAGE NR. 1	NR. OF PAGES 9		Downgraded To <i>CONFIDENTIAL</i> By Authority Of <i>DOT Director</i> By <i>DJA</i> NLE <i>10/1/80</i>
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cannot be implemented within the next two fiscal years. The Berlin situation and the fact that the US has been urging upon our NATO partners increases in their military contributions dictate that we undertake personnel reductions finally decided upon without undue haste and in areas which will not reduce our D-Day effectiveness or unbalance our overall posture. Specific comments on the proposals set forth in ref A follow.

2. (S) Enclosure A (Comments keyed to paras of encl):

a. Para 1. I agree that the support units which CINCUSAREUR indicated could be returned on an initial priority basis can be returned to CONUS during the first quarter of FY63 without seriously degrading combat posture.

b. Para 2. I agree with the philosophy that appropriate nations should provide required non-divisional supporting forces for committed divisions. I have supported this at every opportunity with the NATO officials. However, full implementation by the nations concerned will not be a short-term proposition. The withdrawal of these US support forces prior to the attainment of operational status by replacement forces would degrade the combat posture of ACE. These units were provided initially as required combat support forces for the 7th Army. They were diverted to support of Allies as a military expedient. Even with the return of these units to 7th Army, artillery, engineer and ordnance support units will remain austere.

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
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Therefore, I recommend against the withdrawal of the conventional artillery, engineer and ordnance units even when replaced by appropriate nations since it would decrease the conventional capability of ACE at a time when we have been urging an increase in this capability. I also recommend against the withdrawal of the 4 missile units (2 Corporal and 2 HJ Bns) since they provide a nuclear capability essential to the successful defense of Western Europe under the present imbalance of conventional forces. If conversion of divisions to ROAD continues as a requirement, the AR Bn is required for this purpose.

c. Para 3.



Transfer of the DA forward depot

to CIGLI is, first of all, dependent on authority from OSD to contact the GOT, as a preliminary to planned construction there. Even if agreement is reached with GOT, and contracts let, this is a long-term proposition.

d. Para 4.

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(1) I agree to the return to CONUS of those personnel fillers referred to in Category A and the Roundout support units referred to in Category B, except for the 45th Med Air Amb Co and the 3 MI Dets provided that plans are developed for their lift to Europe within 10 - 14 days. Such plans would have to provide for the repositioning of equipment and would establish a requirement for caretaker personnel not now available in USAREUR. The return of the 45th Med Air Amb Co appears inadvisable in view of the fact that one such unit is programmed for activation in FY63.

(2) I agree that fillers provided to mechanize the Inf Divs should remain in Europe permanently.

(3) With respect to Cat C personnel (7th Army fillers), I concur that they should be retained in Europe until the Berlin situation has clearly moderated. Of course, return of these fillers to CONUS will result in TO/E line deletions to combat units, thereby degrading the sustained combat capability of the 7th Army and reducing the capability for reorganization to the ROAD structure. Hence, I recommend plans be developed for redeployment of these filler personnel to Europe within 14 days.

(4) Cat D. Combat and support units. To return these units will reduce the austere conventional artillery and ordnance support of 7th Army, will reduce the Armored Cavalry capability below adequate levels, will withdraw communications support for the USAREUR War HQ and HQ USEUCOM Alternate,

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and decrease the capability of converting to ROAD. I recommend against this action.

e. Para 5.

(1) NODEX Units. In ref B, I agreed to the return of these units to CONUS provided equipment was prepositioned in Europe and personnel could be returned by D + 14.

(2) Adjustment in COMZ activities. I agree with CINC-USAREUR comments being forwarded to DA separately that this reduction is not feasible in view of the following support missions which have recently been assumed by USAREUR: increased maintenance support requirements resulting from mechanization of the infantry divisions; support for prepositioned divisional equipment; support for the previously approved increased levels of supply in the depot system. Detailed personnel requirements for the support of these missions are being assessed by USAREUR.

(3) Unit Activations, FY63. Refer to comments contained in para 2f below.

(4) Return of 10th SFG. In ref B, I non-concurred in the return of this unit to CONUS since it would degrade our D-Day UW capability, increase costs of transportation and complicate planning, impair the use of teams for training assistance, and would have an adverse psychological impact. The currently programmed strength increase to this unit of 800 spaces in FY63 should be implemented and personnel deployed to Europe as programmed.

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(5) Inactivation and/or return of units. I recommend against the withdrawal or inactivation of the tank companies. Requirements for armor units in 7th Army have increased as a result of the mechanization of the infantry divisions and additional armored units will be required for the conversion to ROAD. Those units are scheduled for conversion to M60 tanks during this calendar year. The 3 light truck companies have already been inactivated and the 504 spaces applied elsewhere. I therefore recommend against the withdrawal of these spaces. In the event of the return of some of the other units, equipment should be prepositioned and plans developed for their return within 10-14 days in the event of emergency.

(6) Reduction in strength of service units. Our medical strength should not, in my opinion, be reduced. The proposed reduction in Military Police strength will cause a slow-down in non-combatant evacuation. Plans should provide for the airlift of augmentation MP units within 14 days.

(7) Replace military with LWR in Area Commands and Garrisons. I agree with CINCUSAREUR's comments to the effect that lessened military effectiveness will result from such a move, and that the major impact will be a reduced capability to implement timely non-combatant evacuation. USAREUR advises that replacement cannot be initiated prior to 4/FY63 due to funding requirements.

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(8) Close USAREUR Schools. In my opinion, the USAREUR school system is the most advantageous and most economical method of fulfilling the formal training requirement of USAREUR. However, elimination of this capability in Europe, except for the NCO Academy, could be accomplished provided: appropriate courses exist in CONUS; transportation and necessary funds are available to insure that personnel can be expeditiously transported to and from CONUS with a minimum loss in time away from units.

(9) Move some Depot Maintenance to Spain. I agree with this proposal. Although the USAREUR position recommends limiting contracts in Spain to work in excess of present rebuild capacity in COMZEUR, the high quality of the work and the low cost warrant exploiting this source to the fullest for all rebuild requirements regardless of the availability of pesetas. I have previously recommended this; however, DA msg 912706, 13 Apr 62 tends to discourage such action.

f. Para 6.

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3.(D) Enclosure B. While some discrepancies exist between manning figures available here and those contained in this encl, order of magnitude of figures is essentially correct.

[REDACTED] as will personnel for the maintenance of heavy equipment and supplies at [REDACTED] as indicated in para 2c above (approximately 500).

4.(S) In the event full implementation of proposals in ref A is directed, there are other major impacts:

a. Line TO/E deletions in combat and support units of USAREUR will approximate 20,000, or about 9% of full TO/E strength. Pre-Roundout distribution of deletions (expressed as per cent of full strength) were less than 2% for divisional and in excess of 5% for non-divisional units of 7th Army. Readjustments, substitutions of LWRs, inactivations and withdrawals of units and fillers, however, will reduce the capability of COMZ and other USAREUR non-divisional activities to absorb the major portion of these line deletions and result in a higher percentage of line deletions from 7th Army.

b. Airlift requirements which will be generated to permit timely augmentation of this command in the event of war or emergency will be increased.

5.(U) I further recommend that regardless of extent of implementation of proposals contained in ref A, that this command and USAREUR be given

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maximum latitude in the determination of where filler personnel will be reduced and in the substitution of units to be returned.

6.(S) In summary, I agree that approximately 42,000 USAREUR spaces can be saved although part of this reduction can be accomplished only over the long term. Of the total, only about 23,500 spaces can be safely released for early return to CONUS.

7.(S) It should be clear from this analysis that the approximately 42,000 personnel who may be returned to the CONUS under this proposal are not only necessary to support combat operations in the event of emergency, but must in fact be augmented. Therefore, no reduction can be accepted as feasible unless the individuals and units involved are available in a trained and ready status in the ZI and equally important, an effective transportation plan is in existence to guarantee delivery within the times indicated in this paper.

8.(U) Recapitulation of current USAFE and USNAVEUR personnel strengths as compared with projected Sep 62 strengths is being forwarded separately.

9.(U) SCP-3. DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS; NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED. DOD DIR 5200.10

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