

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING AT 8:30 A.M. TODAY

Attended by:       The President  
                       Secretary Herter  
                       Secretary Quarles  
                       Dr. Killian  
                       Allan Dulles  
                       Gordon Gray  
                       General Goodpaster  
                       and the writer

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 By MMK NLDDE Date 3/7/11

The purpose of the meeting was to review the U. S. position on cessation of nuclear weapons tests.

The specific question of the meeting was opened by Secretary Herter reading the first page of the attached memorandum, Tab 1.

I was asked to comment and I spoke to the question by reference to *my* notes --- Attachment 2.       I reviewed each step in the developments of underground detection capabilities substantially as outlined in Comments 1 through 6 and ended up with the recommendation that we pursue the U. S. plan for the two-phase program.

Secretary Quarles agreed with my position concerning detection of underground tests *but* and expressed a DOD position that negotiations should be continued because the prospects of a successful conclusion of the negotiations *was* so remote that no serious risk was involved.



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Dr. Killian questioned Dr. Teller's statement indicating that Dr. Teller must have used different data than was used by Dr. Bethe and Dr. Latter in their Berkner Report.

NOTE: It turned out that Dr. Teller was wrong and that he used feet instead of meters, and diameter instead of radius, and therefore his decoupling of a 200-megaton bomb required a 1300-foot diameter cavity rather than 400-foot diameter cavity.

This error caused me some embarrassment. Dr. Teller has since corrected his figures.

Allan Dulles indicated the importance of inspection stations inside of Russia.

The President stated his position in several different ways:

- (a) He was increasingly concerned over <sup>adverse</sup> world opinion <sup>if</sup> that we should break off negotiations except and unless our doing so was clearly <sup>dependable</sup>.
- (b) He was concerned about the growing fear in this country <sup>over</sup> concerning radioactive fallout.
- (d) He thought the detection system must be improved with additional stations, seismographs, etc., and assumed that our negotiators were keeping this in mind.
- (d) He assumed that the number of inspections would be related to the technical data <sup>and</sup> for the indications of ~~the~~ instruments and that the inspections would be uninhibited.
- (e) He wanted reasonable safeguards but he seemed to think that a sufficient number of on-site inspections would deter serious violations.





Secretary Herter than spoke of the unresolved issues as set forth in Tab 3. He concluded that these were so numerous and so serious to the Soviets that several of them could cause a breakdown in the negotiations.

The President then expressed his private opinion that the negotiations would not result in agreement and that we would then, <sup>if</sup> necessary, make a unilateral declaration suspending atmospheric tests. At several points in the discussion, and following the President's statements I said that the AEC strongly supported an agreement with Russia to immediately stop atmospheric tests with reasonable detection arrangements but that we would favor unilateral stopping of these tests if agreement with Russia could not be reached. Secretary Quarles stated that DOD would favor proceeding with atmospheric tests if Russia conducted a series. The President seemed to disagree with Secretary Quarles' viewpoint very sharply.

The President concluded that we <sup>sh</sup> would proceed with the negotiations probing every possible concession from the Soviets, emphasized the importance of reasonably adequate safeguards, and insisted upon improvements to the inspection system.

I finally again stated our concern that negotiations had drifted unfavorably for us and <sup>4</sup> warned that under the presently known technology, underground inspections could not be detected.

I finally brought up the China question which was discussed briefly; it was concluded that the China problem must ultimately be dealt with but that it is a separate problem because of the great many questions concerning United States and the Free World's relationships with Communist China.

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