

UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND

INCOMING

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23 AUG 62
SAC IN 62913

INFO: DCINC; R/F; J-3; J-4; J-2; J-2DC; USMR; CENTRAL FILES; CD

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FROM: DA
TO: CINCSAREUR
INFO: USARCOM2EUR
REF NO: DA 917661

*Misc
Work*

FROM ODCSOPS.

1. (S) A. THIS OFFICE HAS BEEN ASSIGNED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PREPARATION OF TWO STUDIES PERTAINING TO ARMY NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE. THE FOLLOWING IS A STATEMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS AS RECEIVED BY THIS OFFICE FROM THE JCS.

(1) "COMMAND AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS"

I. PURPOSE OF STUDY

THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY IS TO ANALYZE THE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM AND PROCEDURES RELATING TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT WITHIN US ARMY UNITS IN EUROPE TO DETERMINE THE VULNERABILITY AND RESPONSIVENESS OF CONTROL SYSTEMS AND THE ASSURANCE THAT CONTROL MEASURES GIVE IN PREVENTING UNAUTHORIZED INITIATION OF THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND IN CONTROLLING THEIR EMPLOYMENT AFTER USE IS INITIATED.

II. BASIS FOR COMPARISON

AN ANALYSIS SHOULD BE MADE OF THE PRESENT COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM FOR ARMY UNITS IN CENTRAL EUROPE TO DETERMINE ITS VITAL WEAKNESSES AND MAJOR SHORTCOMINGS (IF ANY) IN NUCLEAR WARFARE.

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Authority NLE 2013-152 #3
By *MUK* NLDD Date 11/21/16

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FOLLOWING THIS THERE SHOULD BE AN EXAMINATION OF STEPS THAT COULD BE UNDERTAKEN AND THE COSTS INVOLVED IN IMPROVING THE SYSTEM BY 1967 SO THAT (1) THE SYSTEM WOULD BE SURVIVABLE IN THE FACE OF A SOVIET NUCLEAR DISARMING STRIKE AND SUBSEQUENT NUCLEAR WARFARE DURING THE LAND BATTLE, (2) ITS RESPONSIVENESS WOULD PERMIT RAPID, POSITIVE CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS USE AT THE DIVISIONS CORPS, ARMY AND THEATER LEVEL AS APPROPRIATE AND (3) ALL APPROPRIATE MEASURES FOR PREVENTING UNAUTHORIZED USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN PEACE AND WAR WOULD BE INCORPORATED.

III. REQUIREMENTS

A. THE STUDY SHOULD PROVIDE INFORMATION (SPECIFIC DATA AND COSTS WHEREVER AVAILABLE) RELATING TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS IN THE 23 MAY 1962 SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEMORANDUM.

(1) "HOW IS COMMAND AND CONTROL PRESERVED IN A TACTICAL NUCLEAR ENVIRONMENT?"

(2) "UNDER CONDITIONS OF INTERCONTINENTAL NUCLEAR WAR ARE ORGANIZED MILITARY OPERATIONS FEASIBLE IN THE SENSE THAT THEY CAN BE CONDUCTED DESPITE NUCLEAR ATTACKS ON COMMAND AND CONTROL CENTERS, AIRFIELDS, AND LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS?"

B. IN ADDITION THE STUDY SHOULD SHOW HOW PERMISSIVE LINKS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS COULD BE INCORPORATED IN THE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM AND THE IMPACT OF PERMISSIVE LINKS ON THE DEGREE OF CONTROL AND RESPONSIVENESS.

(2) "NUCLEAR WEAPON STORAGE AND PHYSICAL SECURITY"

I. PURPOSE OF STUDY

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THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY IS TO EXAMINE PRESENT NUCLEAR WEAPON STORAGE PROCEDURES IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND VARIATIONS OF THESE PROCEDURES TO DETERMINE THEIR EFFICACY (1) IN NON-NUCLEAR WAR, (2) DURING AN ENEMY INDUCED TRANSITION TO NUCLEAR WAR, AND (3), IN NUCLEAR WAR.

II. BASIS FOR COMPARISON

AT PRESENT SACEUR HAS SPECIFIC RESTRAINTS WITH RESPECT TO RELEASE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND HAS PRESCRIBED POLICIES REGARDING STORAGE AND PHYSICAL SECURITY OF THESE WEAPONS. THE SYSTEM, DESIGNED TO PROVIDE ACCEPTABLE RESPONSIVENESS CONSISTENT WITH SECURITY, HAS CERTAIN WEAKNESSES OF WHICH VULNERABILITY AND DELAY IN CONVERTING FROM NON-NUCLEAR TO NUCLEAR COMBAT ARE IMPORTANT. BY 1967, INSTALLATION OF PERMISSIVE UNITS AS A CONTROL DEVICE MAY PERMIT CHANGES IN STORAGE AND SECURITY PROCEDURES. FURTHER STEPS MAY REDUCE VULNERABILITY OF THE STORAGE, COMMUNICATION AND DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS. A COMPARISON SHOULD BE MADE OF THE PRESENT STORAGE AND SECURITY SYSTEM WITH AN IMPROVED SYSTEM THAT COULD BE OPERATING BY 1967.

III. REQUIREMENTS

A. THE STUDY SHOULD PROVIDE INFORMATION (SPECIFIC DATA WHEREVER AVAILABLE) RELATING TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

(1) DOES THE PROXIMITY OF FIELD ARMY TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO AREAS IN WHICH CONVENTIONAL COMBAT IS BEING FOUGHT CREATE A PROBLEM OF: (A) PHYSICAL SECURITY FOR THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR, (B) ASSURANCE THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL NOT BE EMPLOYED WITHOUT PROPER AUTHORITY IN TIME OF STRESS?

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(2) IN THE EVENT OF CONVENTIONAL COMBAT, WOULD

IT BE DESIRABLE TO CENTRALIZE NUCLEAR WEAPONS (AN CERTAIN DELIVERY SYSTEMS) IN PROTECTED STORAGE SITES TO ENSURE THEIR AVAILABILITY IN THE EVENT OF NUCLEAR WAR? WHAT WOULD BE THE PENALTIES INVOLVED AND THE COST FOR SO PROTECTING ARMY NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS IN EUROPE (FOR 8-INCH AND 155MM HOWITZER, CONSIDER NUCLEAR SHELL STORAGE ONLY)? ALTERNATIVELY, WOULD IT BE BETTER TO PROVIDE FOR PROTECTION THROUGH A CONCEPT OF DISPERSAL PLUS MOBILITY?

(3) WHAT IS THE VULNERABILITY OF THE PRESENT STORAGE SYSTEM FOR ARMY NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE FROM THE STANDPOINT OF PROTECTION AND SECURITY FROM: (A) ATTACK BY AIRCRAFT USING CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS, (B) AIRCRAFT OR MISSILES USING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, (C) OVERRUN AND CAPTURE, (D) ATTACK BY AIRBORNE FORCES AND (E) SABOTAGE.

F. IN CASE OF THE SECOND STUDY, ALTHOUGH NOT SPECIFICALLY INDICATED, IS A REQUIREMENT TO INCLUDE CONSIDERATION OF WEAPONS PROVIDED IN SUPPORT OF NON-U.S. NATO FORCES.

2. (S) IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU PROVIDE YOUR VIEWS BY 8 AUGUST ON:

- A. ANY WEAKNESSES AND VULNERABILITIES OF THE PRESENT COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM AND PRESENT STORAGE AND SECURITY SYSTEM.
- B. IMPROVEMENTS IN THESE AREAS WHICH COULD BE EFFECTED BY 1967.
- C. ANY OTHER ASPECTS REQUIRING SPECIAL CONSIDERATION. SC#3

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