

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

Belgium *cr 14* ✓

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Action SS
Info

Classification Control: 6087
Rec'd: August 10, 1960
1:11 p.m.

FROM: Paris

TO: Secretary of State

EYES ONLY

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NO: POLTO 248, August 10, 3 p.m.



NIACT

SENT DEPARTMENT POLTO 248, REPEATED INFORMATION NIACT BRUSSELS POLTO 32.

EYES ONLY

Called on Spaak at noon today to see if he had any comment on Eysken's statement yesterday re Belgium reviewing NATO force contributions.

Spaak in most serious and depressed mood. He goes to Brussels this afternoon at request of King, who wants him to form new government. He not sure he can succeed, as conditions which he will put to Parliament will be stiff. He pointed out Socialists are basically neutral, and Eyskens proposals to cut NATO defenses have landed on well-tilled soil. He is persuaded that withdrawal of Belgian troops from Germany to Belgium, coupled with only twelve months service, means that Belgium might as well do away with its armed forces. But this would play into hands of neutralists. Whether he can form government on his basis and carry out his policy he feels is very doubtful.

He made the foregoing remarks in course of discussing Belgian reaction, and his own, to UNSC debate. He opened conversation by telling me that he was preparing letter to the President (draft of which he showed me), which expressed his complete dismay at brusque, terse statement Lodge had made in UNSC debate night before last. Letter said he was not at all worried about US vote on resolution but fact that no hint of recognition of Belgian cooperation was given was to him effect unpardonable. He had devoted many years to trying to develop

consultation

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Authority NLE 2006-113 #1

By *MMK* NLDDE Date 3/9/11

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consultation to point where differences between allies were minimized, and this had not been done in this case. Letter concluded by stating he felt it his duty to state frankly his dismay. He has not yet decided to send letter, since Destaercke urged him to sleep on it, and of course I did the same.

He said that in addition he intended resign as Secretary General. His work had been complete failure. How could he speak with conviction of consultation in NATO and ten-year planning when present realities proved that they did not work (he also made this point in draft letter, in which he said that our thoughts on ten-year planning were only words).

I pointed out to him that our public statement after Lumumba had left made it clear that we did not think Belgium was aggressor and gave credit to Belgian position. His terse answer was "why did not Lodge say so in UN?" He deplored fact that a small gesture of understanding and sympathy had not been made at this important time. When I pointed out various pressures on US delegation at UNSC, he stressed again that he did not quarrel with vote of US, and went on to say that if solidarity on basic positions could not be achieved, at least solidarity in presenting line of retreat could be worked out. When I pointed out we, like himself, had urged Belgians to make public statement on troop withdrawal, he was bitter in his castigation of present government, but said this still would have allowed development of common stance so as not to create impression that alliance was hollow sham. He did not know how he could persuade Belgian opinion otherwise, nor himself.

He asked whether the alliance was really worth anything in these circumstances if allies would not stand together in time of troubles of one. This was the sort of action, he said, which went to roots of NATO concept he had been trying to develop and could

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could force countries like Belgium to neutrality and do nothing but sponsor the development of more restricted blocs. The issue was not merely one of troop contributions to NATO, but of basic policy related to common understanding and support. He warned the US might some day find itself accused in UN and suggested we look at situation from that point of view.

I assured Spaak that our policy with respect to NATO and our allies remained absolutely unchanged, that our purposes and dedication to the sort of NATO he believed in were real convictions, and said that I could not believe, on further consideration and once whole story appeared, that he would fail to see that we had to go forward in our attempts to remain united in NATO rather than to let one problem end this all-important effort. I urged him to reconsider and held in abeyance any decision with regard to his resignation as Secretary General. He said he was useless here as his work had met with a total checkmate, but when I responded that the loss of one battle was not the loss of a war, the old Spaak twinkle came into his eyes again and he said he would think about it further. (Comment: I would not be sure what his decision will be) if he does not succeed in forming a government, he will take action and think things over.

Comment: Spaak was in no way emotional, and always calm during discussion. He was obviously dismayed at the problems that confront him in trying to form a Belgian Government in these circumstances, but his concern at impact on whole NATO effort of US public posture was genuine, profound, and sincere.

Can Department provide any information as to why our presentation in UNSC was so terse from Belgian point of view, or any details of contact between Lodge and Wigny which may ameliorate the appearance we have given to Spaak of having completely brushed aside the sensitivities of an ally?

WOLF

JAK-7

Note: Mr. Calhoun(SS) notified of receipt of message 3:10 p.m.
8/10/60; CWO/M